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THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT AS A FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION "WITHHOLDING" STATUTE t
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 1 requires federal
agencies to disclose publicly much of the information contained in
their files,2 but it does not include procedures for safeguarding the
legitimate interests of citizens whose submissions of information are
in government custody. This Comment examines how courts have
exercised their power to prevent harmful disclosures, focusing on
two decisions that discuss the relationship between a nondisclosure
provision of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA)3 and the
general policy of the FOIA. The central issue is whether Congress
intended the requirements of fairness and accuracy, which limit
affirmative publications by the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion (CPSC), to apply to FOIA disclosures as well. To answer this
question one must consider the political context out of which the
CPSA evolved, a task that courts have been reluctant to undertake.
Because this consideration is critical to an understanding of the
Act, this Comment explores the legislative history of the CPSA to
ascertain the intent of Congress.
The CPSA requires manufacturers to submit large quantities
of commercial data to the CPSC.4 The interest of these manu-
facturers in preventing FOIA disclosure is representative of the
f See note, page 1200.
15 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
2 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290 (1979) ("[T]he basic objective
of the Act is disclosure.") (footnote omitted); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co., 437 U.S. 214, 221 (1978) ("[Ulnless the requested material falls within one
of . . . nine statutory exemptions, FOTA requires that records and material in the
possession of federal agencies be made available on demand to any member of the
general public."); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)
(In adopting FOIA, Congress sought "to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy
and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny."), aff'g and quoting Rose
v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (1974); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73,
80 (1973) (The Act "seeks to permit access to official information long shielded
unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable
public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands.");
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in Suacoamm. ON
AnMnisTRATrvE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE Comm. ON TIE JunicmiY,
93D CONC., 2D Sxss., FREEDOM OF INFORMAmTO, ACT SouRcE Boox 38 (Comm.
Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as SOtRcE Boox]. (The bill's purpose is "to
establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is
exempted under clearly delineated statutory language and to provide a court
procedure by which citizens and the press may obtain information wrongfully
withheld."); see H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966), repinted in
[19661 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2418, & in SoURcE BoorK, supra, at 22.
315 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2082 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
4 See id. §§ 2064(b) & 2076(b). See also text accompanying notes 226-27
infra.
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concerns of many American businessmen. 5 These suppliers of data
fear the consequences of release of this information to the public,
particularly when the persons seeking such information under the
FOIA are competitors, 6 potential litigants,7 the press,8 labor organi-
zations,9 or consumer groups.'0
While the FOIA specifically provides for judicial review of
agency 1 decisions 12 (under one or more of nine FOIA exemp-
tions) 13 not to comply with a request for disclosure, no provision
was made in the FOIA for submitters of information to challenge
agency decisions to disclose that information. The result of this
void was development of the "reverse-FOIA" suit,'- a judicial crea-
tion that enabled submitters of information to obtain injunctions
against release of that information under certain circumstances. 15
Last year, in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,1 the Supreme Court
held that there is no implied right of action for information sup-
pliers under the FOIA itself.'7 Persons aggrieved by an agency's
proposed release of information are not totally without remedy,
however. The Court held that an injunction is obtainable under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 18 if the release of the
information is "not in accordance with law." 19 Such a showing
GSee, e.g., 34 Bus. LAw. 975, 975-1145 (1979) (ABA symposium on FOIA,
Government in the Sunshine Act, and Privacy Act, Dec. 9-10, 1977).
6E.g., Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
7 E.g., Shermco Indus. Inc. v. Secretary of United States Air Force, 452
F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
S E.g., Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
9 E.g., National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Campbell, 593 F.2d 1023 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
10 E.g., Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321 (D.D.C. 1973).
"1 The term "agency" includes "any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment
in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the
President), or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976).
The reach of that definition remains a subject of litigation. See Forsham v. Harris,
100 S. Ct. 978 (1980).
125 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)-(G) (1976 & Supp. 111978).
a See note 36 infra.
14 The first reverse-FOIA suit was brought approximately seven years ago.
See Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need for
Congressiona Action, 67 GCo. L. J. 103, 108 (1978). This method of attempting
to prevent FOIA disclosures has become popular with businesses that have submitted
the information sought. Id. 108 n.29; see generallj id. 104-10.
15 See text accompanying notes 40-58 infra.
16441 U.S. 281 (1979).
17 Id. 290-94.
18 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
'9441 U.S. at 318 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (1976)).
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can be made if there exists a statute that prohibits disclosure of
the type of information sought.2°
Statutes that meet the qualifications established in exemption 3
of the FOIA, exempting specific classes of information from dis-
closure, will always be sufficient for such a showing.21 Exemption 3
provides:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by stat-
ute (other than section 552b of this title), provided
that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave
no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types
of matters to be withheld .... 22
A few statutes, such as those protecting Internal Revenue 23
and Census Bureau 24 records have been recognized by the courts as
exemption 3 antidisclosure statutes.2 5  They represent easy cases,
however. There is no doubt that they are exemption 3 statutes
because they require no judgment on the part of an agency, but
prohibit disclosure absolutely. A case now pending before the
Supreme Court, GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety
Commission,26 presents a more difficult problem. At issue in the
case is whether section 6(b)(1) 27 of the Consumer Product Safety
20 In Chrysler, the Court held that a violation of the Trade Secrets Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), would be an action "not in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C.
§706(2) (A) (1976), and, therefore, enjoinable. 441 U.S. at 318.
21 Chrysler suggests that other statutes, such as the Trade Secrets Act, may
also be sufficient in the absence of independent authorization by law in the form of
"property promulgated, substantive agency regulations." 441 U.S. at 295-96.
225 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) (1976). This is the wording of the exemption as
it now stands. For the wording before its amendment in 1976, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (b) (3) (1970) (amended 1976), quoted in text at note 80 infra.
231.R.C. § 6103. Congress has also adopted a statute that controls public
access to "any written determinations" or related background materials of the
Internal Revenue Service. I.R.C. § 6110.
2413 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1976). See note 89 infra.
25 Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 82
(1979) (income tax returns required to be withheld under I.R.C. § 6103); Fruehauf
Corp. v. IRS, 566 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1977) (materials required to be withheld
under I.R.C. § 6110); Grenier v. IRS, 449 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1978) (materials
required to be withheld under I.R.C. § 6110); Seymour v. Barabba, 559 F.2d 806
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (census records).
26598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 479 (1979) (No. 79-521).
2715 U.S.C. §2055(b)(1) (1976). See notes 123-26 infra & accompanying
[Vol 128:1166
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT
Act requires the Consumer Product Safety Commission to withhold
certain information from FOIA requesters: that is, whether it is
an FOIA withholding statute within the meaning of exemption 3
even though the Act prohibits disclosure of only particular types
of information and the agency must use some judgment in classify-
ing requested information.
Part I of the Comment examines the development of reverse-
FOIA suits by information suppliers, focusing on cases in which
suppliers relied on nondisclosure statutes. Part II describes the
ambiguity in the public disclosure section of the Consumer Product
Safety Act, which has been interpreted by the Second Circuit 28 as
applying only to agency-initiated publications, and by the Third
Circuit 29 as being applicable to FOIA-requested disclosures as well.
Both courts relied on legislative history to determine the scope of
this section, but each read that history without reference to the
political context in which it was written. A thorough examination
of the legislative history, in part III, indicates that Congress never
directly considered the question of FOIA requests to the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, but, they did adopt a general policy
against unfair and inaccurate disclosures. This part shows that the
CPSA disclosure policy can be misread if political forces are dis-
counted in evaluating the legislative history. The Comment con-
cludes from analysis of the history that Congress intended the
general requirement of fairness and accuracy to apply to FOIA
disclosures as well as to CPSC-initiated publications.
I. WITHHOLDING INFORMATION UNDER THE FOIA
A. The Former Status of Reverse-FOIA Suits
The Freedom of Information Act is a device which is designed
to compel a government agency to reveal secrets hidden in its files.8 0
In fact, its scope is much broader than that. The Act requires
agencies to make information routinely available to the public,
31
although in practice an agency may not comply with a request if it
is not in writing and labelled "Freedom of Information Act Re-
quest." 32 Under the FOIA, agencies must publish descriptions of
28Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978).
29 GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. CPSC, 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 479 (1979) (No. 79-521).
305 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(B)-(G) (1976 & Supp. I 1978).
31 Id. § 552(a) (1)-(4) (A).
32 The FOIA requires that agencies publish in the Federal Register descriptions
of how they will process requests for documents. Id. §552(a)(1)(A). (A
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their organization and procedures in the Federal Register; 1 make
documents of major public interest routinely available to the
public; 34 and comply with all reasonable requests for specific docu-
ments,35 unless the document could properly be withheld from dis-
closure under one of the nine FOIA exemptions.3 6 Only as a means
directory to these statements can be found in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552, 76-78 (1977).)
The statement by the Department of Agriculture is typical:
(a) Any person who wishes to inspect, or obtain copies of any record
of an agency of the Department shall submit a request in writing and
addressed to the official designated in regulations promulgated by the
agency. All such requests for records shall be deemed to have been
made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, regardless of whether
that Act is specifically mentioned. To facilitate processing of a request,
the phrase "FOTA REQUEST" should be placed in capital letters on
the front of the envelope.
7 C.F.R. §1.3(a) (1979). See also 15 C.F.R. §4.5(a)-(c) (1979) (Dept. of
Commerce); 41 C.F.R. § 105-60.402-1(a) (1979) (GSA) ("Requests should bear
the legend, 'FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST,' prominently marked on
both the face of the request letter and the envelope."); 45 C.F.R. § 5.51(a)-(c)
(1979) (HEW).
The CPSC has stated that: "An oral request for records will not be considered
a request for records pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Responses to
oral requests for records shall be made as promptly as resources and time restraints
permit" 16 C.F.R. § 1015.3(a) (1979).
Nothing in the Act suggests that agencies are to treat "FOA REQUESTS"
differently from ordinary "requests," or written requests from oral ones, but in
dealing with most agencies, the requester runs the risk that his inquiry will be
lost in the bureaucratic shuffle if it is not in writing and does not cite the FOLA.
335 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976).
34 Id. § 552(a) (2).
;1d. §§ 552(a)(3) & (4)(A).
36 The full FOIA exemption provision reads as follows:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than
section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires
that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to
leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria
for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such records would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person
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of enforcing these requirements does FOIA provide for suits to
compel disclosure. 37 Conceived in terms of government documents
and agency secrets, and thus aimed at bureaucrats resisting release
of information damaging to themselves or to their agencies,38 the
Act nowhere provides a mechanism by which a third party with an
interest in a government file may sue to prevent its disclosure.39
This gap has led to the development of the reverse-FOIA suit, a
judicial creation which has continually perplexed the courts.
Reverse-FOIA plaintiffs have presented numerous arguments to
prevent disclosure. Several distinct theories can, however, be dis-
cerned in the cases. 40 First, a few courts accepted the argument
that the FOIA, with its exemptions, implies a cause of action for
submitters comparable to the express cause of action provided for
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by
the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and pro-
cedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforce-
ment personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or con-
dition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any
person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are
exempt under this subsection.
5 U.S.C. §552(b) (1976).
371d. §552(a)(4)(B)-(G) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
38H.R. BREP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966), reprinted in [1966]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEwS 2418, 2422-23, & in SotacE Boo, supra note 2, at
22, 26-27; H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10, 12-42 (1972), reprinted
in SuBcomm. ON GOVEmaMNT INFORMATION AND INDrVDtuAL EIGHTS, HOUSE
COMs. ON GOVERNMIENT OPERATIONS & SUBCOM/. ON AntaiuNisTnATrvE PRACTICE
ANTD PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIAlY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502) 8, 15-17, 19-49 (Joint Comm. Print
1975).
S Campbell, supra note 14, at 107; Wachtell, Disclosure to Third Parties of
Information Filed with Government Agencies: Preventing Disclosure to Third
Parties, 34 Bus. LAw. 1049, 1050 (1979) ("[T]his entire subject . . . was largely
unforeseen by Congress . . . ").
40For a more thorough discussion of the issue as it stood before Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, see Campbell, supra note 14, at 130-56; Clement, The Rights of
Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information:
The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. REV. 587 (1977);
English, Protecting the Stakeholder: Defense of the Government Agency's Interests
During Reverse FOIA Lawsuits, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 151, 158-59 (1979); see also
Note, Chrysler Corporation v. Brown: Seeking a Formula for Responsible Disclosure
under the FOIA, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 159, 166-74 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
CATH. U. Note].
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requesters.4 ' This argument, attractive because it is simple and
direct like the FOIA disclosure procedure on which it is based,
depends on a holding that the Act requires agencies to withhold
documents described in the exemptions, even though the FOIA
only says that the statute "does not apply to matters" that fall
within the nine exemptions.
42
A second theory approved by some courts is that disclosure
may be enjoined if release of the information sought would entail
a violation of some other statute.43  The Trade Secrets Act 44 is the
statute most commonly cited as barring disclosure.45 Several ration-
ales for this argument have been advanced in the cases: -1 1) that
the antidisclosure statute itself implies a right of action, regardless
of the FOIA; 47 2) that if the material sought falls within any of
the nine exceptions to the FOIA,48 the FOIA does not apply and
release contrary to the antidisclosure statute would be an enjoin-
able abuse of discretion; 49 and 3) that if, but only if, the anti-
disclosure statute qualifies as an FOIA exemption 3 statute, it con-
trols, serving as sufficient basis for an injunction.50  Whatever the
4 1 E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1211 (4th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); but see 542 F.2d at 1197-98
(seeming to contradict discussion at 1211).
425 U.S.C. §552(b) (1976). For a fuller discussion of this theory, see
Campbell, supra note 14, at 131-35.
4 3 E.g., Charles River Park "'A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
44 The Act reads as follows:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of
any department or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes
known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any informa-
tion coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or
by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report
or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or
employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade
secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity,
confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses,
or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association;
or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any
abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person
except as provided by law; shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from
office or employment.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
45 See Campbell, supra note 14, at 144 & n.254.
46 Id. 143-56.
47 E.g., Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d 970, 976-77 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
48 See note 36 supra.
49 E.g., Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
SOE.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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rationale, this method of reasoning avoids the question of whether
the FOIA exemptions are mandatory.
Finally, courts have recognized 51 that a decision to comply
with an FOIA request may be challenged under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).52 The APA, however, provides for only
limited review of an agency decision.15  Because the FOIA provides
that a court reviewing an agency denial of an FOIA request for
disclosure "shall determine the matter de novo," 14 some courts
concluded that reverse-FOIA review under this third theory, relying
on the APA, should also be de novo.55 Other courts 56 refused to
read FOIA procedures into the APA, and reviewed the agency
action on the record, following APA standards 57 and remanding
the case to the agency if the agency record was inadequate.58
B. The Chrysler Opinion
The recent unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 5 has uprooted most of the established
judicial inventiveness in reverse-FOIA suits. The decision flatly
rejected the first and simplest theory, that a cause of action for
submitters of data was implied by the FOIA itself.60 The Court
held that the nine exemptions merely state what an agency may
51 E.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978).
See Campbell, supra note 14, at 135-43.
525 U.S.C. §§701-706 (1976).
535 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). An agency action must be set aside if the action
was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law," id. § 706(2) (A); or if the action failed to meet constitutional, id.
§ 706(2) (B) statutory, id. § 706(2) (C) or procedural standards, id. § 706(2) (D);
or, in "narrow, specifically limited situations," Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971), if the action is "unsupported by substantial
evidence." 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(E) (1976). The "substantial evidence" test is
proper only if the action 1) involved agency rulemaking, or 2) is based on "a
public adjudicatory hearing." 401 U.S. at 414. De novo review is available
under APA, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(F) (1976), but only when 1) the action is
adjudicatory and agency factfinding procedures are inadequate; or 2) issues "not
before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency
action.' 401 U.S. at 415.
545 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
55 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 939-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
56 General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1978);
Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1192 (3d Cir. 1977), reo'd on other
grounds sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
57 See note 53 supra.
58 See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (per curiam).
59 441 U.S. 281 (1979). See generally CATH. U. Note, supra note 40.
60 441 U.S. at 290-94.
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withhold from disclosure, and concluded that disclosures made
despite an exemption do not "violate" the FOIA.61
The Court curtailed the applicability of the second theory,
which relies on the nondisclosure directive of some other statute,
by holding that the commonly cited Trade Secrets Act 62 does not
create a private cause of action. The plaintiff in Chrysler, as in
most cases involving commercial secrets, had relied entirely on the
Trade Secrets Act. The Court pointed out that the Act is a criminal
statute prohibiting unauthorized disclosures by government em-
ployees, and held that there was insufficient need to recognize an
implied private cause of action under it because of the availability
of review under the APA.63
The Court's conclusions reduced Chrysler to the third theory,
review under the APA. The case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals for a determination of whether disclosure by the agency
would constitute an abuse of discretion under the APA.64  The
Court stated that if disclosure would violate the Trade Secrets Act,65
it would not be "in accordance with law" under the APA.66 The
opinion added that a court considering an APA challenge would
"ordinarily" not need to consider the question de novo, 67 suggesting
that the limited APA review,68 with its often time-consuming pro-
cedures,6 9 is the correct approach in cases in which FOIA releases
are challenged.
After Chrysler, then, the method by which an aggrieved sub-
mitter of information can challenge an FOIA disclosure is under
the APA. If disclosure would violate an antidisclosure statute, it is
"not in accordance with law," 70 and is consequently enjoinable
under the APA, provided that the FOIA itself does not constitute
authorization of law. The FOIA does provide authorization, un-
less the information sought falls within one or more of the nine
61 1d. 292-94.
62 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
63 441 U.S. at 316-17.
64Id. 318-19. The Court of Appeals subsequently remanded the case to the
agency. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 130331, 20 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1335 (3d Cir. 1979).
65 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
66 441 U.S. at 318.
671d.
68 See note 53 supra.
69 Review under the APA may be quite lengthy if the record has to be
remanded to the agency for augmentation. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v.
Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978). See also notes 58 & 64 supra &
accompanying text.
705 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (1976). See note 53 supra.
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exemptions. If it does fall within an exemption, the FOIA does
not apply.
In arguing that the Trade Secrets Act bars disclosure, a plain-
tiff must then show that 1) the information sought is within an
FOIA exemption, and 2) that the release of that information would
violate the Trade Secrets Act.7 ' In light of the parallel between the
language of the Trade Secrets Act 72 and that of FOIA exemp-
tion 4,73 the material sought may fall within that exemption.74
Exemption 4, however, only applies to commercial information.
Exemption 3, which was not at issue in Chrysler,75 authorizes with-
holding of any material specifically exempted from disclosure by
some other statute.76 When an "exemption 3 withholding statute"
is at issue, the APA test is relatively simple: material falling within
that exempting statute automatically falls within exemption 3 and,
because the release is prohibited by the withholding statute and,
therefore, "not authorized by law," it can be enjoined. There may,
however, be a difficult preliminary question: does the statute
qualify as an exemption 3 statute? We turn now to that question.
C. The Amended Exemption 3
In response to a broad reading of the original language by the
Supreme Court, Congress amended exemption 3 in 1976 77 by add-
ing a restrictive proviso.78 Since then, few statutes have been recog-
nized as exemption 3 withholding statutes.7 9
As originally enacted in 1966, exemption 3 excluded from dis-
closure "matters . . . specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute." 80 In the 1975 case, Administrator, Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration v. Robertson,8' the Supreme Court held that the FAA
7118 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
72 Id. See note 44 supra.
735 U.S.C. §552(b)(4) (1976). See note 36 supra.
74 The relationship between the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976),
and exemption 4, 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4) (1976), has not been settled by the
courts. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 319 n.49 (1979); Shermco
Indus. Inc. v. Secretary of United States Air Force, 452 F. Supp. 306, 323-24
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (Cost proposals submitted by government contractor to Air
Force do not fall within the Trade Secrets Act prohibition, but may fall within
FOIA exemption 4.).
75 441 U.S. at 319 n.49.
765 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
77 Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1241,
1247 (1976).
785 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
79 See notes 88-109 infra & accompanying text.
805 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) (1970) (amended 1976).
81422 U.S. 255 (1975).
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was authorized by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 82 to withhold
data submitted by airlines from an FOIA request by the Center for
the Study of Responsive Law. The Federal Aviation Act provided:
"Whenever such objection is made, the Board or Administrator
shall order such information withheld from public disclosure when,
in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely
affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest
of the public." 8 In ruling that this Act constituted an exemp-
tion 3 withholding statute, the Supreme Court disregarded the strict
interpretation by most Courts of Appeals of the phrase, "specifically
exempted," 84 and thereby opened a broad new avenue for reverse-
FOIA suits.
The next year, Congress responded by adding to exemption 3
the following proviso: "that such statute (A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave
no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be with-
held." 85 According to the Conference Committee Report, "[t]he
conferees intend this language to overrule the decision of the
Supreme Court in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson .... ," 86
Thus, Congress took away from administrative agencies whatever
authority the agencies had to create new exemptions to the Freedom
of Information Act, and required instead a specific congressional
predetermination that certain types of data should be kept confi-
dential. Apart from the expressed intention to overrule Robertson,
however, the legislative history concerning the amendment of ex-
emption 3 adds virtually nothing to the bare words of the statute.8 7
8249 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1970).
83 Id. § 1504.
84 See, e.g., Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1974); Serchuk v.
Weinberger, 493 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1974). But see, e.g., California v. Weinberger,
505 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821
(5th Cir. 1971).
855 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) (1976).
86 H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CoDE CONG. & An. NEws 2244, 2250.
87 The Conference Committee Report states:
[The third exemption, incorporating by reference exemptions contained
in other statutes, applies only to statutes that either (a) require that the
information be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave
no discretion on the issue, or (b) establish particular criteria for with-
holding or refer to particular types of information to be withheld. The
conferees intend this language to overrule . . . Robertson ....
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2244, 2250. See also Hein, Obtaining Access to Information in the
Files of Government Agencies: The Corporate Perspective, 34 Bus. LA-w. 993, 997
(1979) ("It was adopted-snuck in, if you will-through conforming amendments
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Judicial interpretations have not been much more helpful.
The courts have rarely taken the opportunity to elucidate the pro-
viso or to explain the intended distinction between parts (A) and
(B). For instance, in Seymour v. Barabba,s one of the first cases
concerning the amended exemption, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that exemption 3 was satisfied by the terms of the
Census Act: 89 "It is a flat barrier to disclosure with no exercise of
discretion permitted. It refers to the particular type of matter to
be withheld .... ," 90 Obviously, the first statement refers to part
(A) and the second to part (B) of the exemption 3 proviso, indicat-
ing that the court was unconcerned with any difference between
the two.21
Other courts have made greater attempts at analysis. For ex-
ample, two cases have discussed the distinction between the ap-
plicability of parts (A) and (B) to the Patent Act, which provides:
Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the
Patent and Trademark Office and no information concern-
ing the same given without authority of the applicant or
owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any
Act of Congress or in such special circumstances as may be
determined by the Commissioner.
92
Despite the apparent grant of discretion in the last clause, the
Ninth Circuit held that this language provides for nondisclosure of
" 'particular types of matter,' patent applications, thus falling
squarely within provision (B) of Exemption 3." 93 Without saying
what was meant by the grant of discretion in the last clause, the
court concluded that "[t]he statute is not an authorization to an
administrator to exempt information from disclosure." 94 In a note,
to the Sunshine Act in the fall of last year [1976]."); Note, The Effect of the
1976 Amendment to Exemption Three of the Freedom of Information Act, 76
COLUm. L. REv. 1029, 1042 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CoLum. Note] ("ETihere
is little legislative history pertaining to the intended scope of the amendment as
finally enacted.").
88 559 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
89 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1976). This section states that the department may not
"use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any purpose
other than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied ......
90 559 F.2d at 808.
91 See also Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (merely
reading the legislative history of the exemption 3 amendment for direct references
to the particular statute at issue, and relying on one representative's belief that the
statute would continue to satisfy the exemption as amended).
9235 U.S.C. § 122 (1976).
93Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 616 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
94 Id.
1980] 1177
1178 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the court added that "[t]he Congress necessarily envisioned that
statutes satisfying provision (B)'s requirements could provide for
limited discretionary disclosure," 95 without indicating what the
limits were. The court did acknowledge that statutes affording
absolute discretion do not qualify.96
Subsequently, the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that
patent applications were protected by the second prong of exemp-
tion 3.97 While admitting that the statute fails to meet the stand-
ards of part (A), because some discretion remains,98 the court
emphasized that "the mere presence of some residual administrative
discretion does not take [the statute] out of Exemption 3." 99 The
court held that the statute satisfies the requirements of part (B)
"because it refers to particular types of matters to be withheld-
namely, patent applications and information concerning them." 100
Again, no attempt was made to define what kind of discretion the
statute allows or how much is permitted under exemption 3. Rather,
the court reasoned, the rule of confidentiality of patent applications
should not be overturned without "rather unambiguous indica-
tions" from Congress.10 1 The intent of Congress is crucial. Here,
the intent was to create a workable patent system, and the court
recognized that system's need for confidentiality.
12
The same Court of Appeals had discussed congressional intent
in an earlier case, American Jewish Congress v. Kreps.-°3 In that
case the District of Columbia Circuit determined that the Export
Administration Act of 1969,104 purporting to give department heads
limited discretion over disclosures, did not qualify as an exemp-
tion 3 statute. The Act provided:
No department, agency, or official exercising any functions
under [the Export Administration Act] shall publish or
disclose information obtained hereunder which is deemed
95 Id. 616 n.8. See also Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. National
Security Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (differentiating between the
"rigor" of (A) and the allowance for "some exercise of administrative discretion in
closely circumscribed situations," not further defined, under (B)).
96 Id. 617.






103 574 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
10450 U.S.C. App. §§2401-2413 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (expired Sept. 30,
1976; reenacted by Act of June 22, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 244, codified
at 50 U.S.C. App. §§2401-2413 (Supp. I 1977)).
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confidential or with reference to which a request for con-
fidential treatment is made by the person furnishing such
information, unless the head of such department or agency
determines that the withholding thereof is contrary to the
national interest.0 5
This statute, empowering agencies to withhold information, but
allowing disclosure when certain officials have found a release to
be in the national interest, clearly did not qualify under part (A)
of exemption 3.106 In deciding whether it satisfied part (B), the
court devised the following test: "When . . . Congress has made
plain its concern with a specific effect of publicity . . . Exemption 3
is to honor that concern." 107 The court went on to say that the
"the crucial distinction" in determining whether a statute meets the
exemption 3(B) standard is "between statutes that in some manner
told the official what to do about disclosure and those that did not
significantly inform his discretion in that regard." 108 Applying this
standard to the Export Administration Act, the court found the
statute too broad and lacking in direction to qualify. 0 9
These cases are among the first to interpret parts (A) and (B)
of exemption 3, and to determine whether specific statutes qualify
as "withholding statutes." The issue in the Consumer Product
Safety Act cases is different, however. The CPSC has not denied
that the requirements of section 6(b)(1) are sufficiently specific and
nondiscretionary to satisfy the amended exemption 3(B).1 0 Rather,
it has contended that section 6(b)(1)'s requirements of accuracy and
fairness M were intended to apply only to "affirmative disclosures"
by the CPSC, not to FOIA requests.112  The Commission's argu-
ment implies that Congress's approach to disclosure in the CPSA
differs fundamentally from that taken in other withholding stat-
utes.n Other statutes which have been recognized as exemption 3
105 Id. § 2406(c). The reenactment cited in note 104 supra authorizes with-
holding of trade boycott information if "the Secretary determines that disclosure
thereof would place the United States person involved at a competitive dis-
advantage." 50 U.S.C. App. §2403-la(b)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
10 574 F.2d at 628.
107 Id. 629.
1o8 Id. (.emphasis in the original).
109 Id. 630-33.
"1o See text accompanying notes 162-69 infra.
111 See note 125 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 127-29 & 144 infra.
113To substantiate this analysis, the CPSC has argued that § 6(b) (1) cannot
be an FOIA withholding statute because it requires the agency to "assure" that
only fair and accurate information is disclosed, rather than merely to decide
whether or not existing file documents may be disclosed. See GTE Sylvania, Inc.
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withholding statutes express a general policy decision against any
disclosure of specified types of information, as does CPSA section
6(b)(1). In drafting such statutes, Congress has never differentiated
between FOIA requests and other forms of disclosure; the cases in
which statutes have been found to satisfy the strict requirements of
exemption 3 have looked for a general congressional policy in favor
of withholding. Correspondingly, these cases have implicitly as-
sumed that the function of exemption 3 is to accommodate such
qualifying statutory directives against disclosure with the general
disclosure mandate of the FOIA.
The interpretation proposed by the CPSC requires an analysis
that is related to, but different from, the analysis in previous cases
in which courts have examined congressional intent to determine
whether a withholding provision satisfied the particularity require-
ments of exemption B(B). We now look at the legislative history
of the CPSA to determine whether Congress intended to take a
radically new approach by setting a standard for "affirmative dis-
closures" that is substantially different from that applied to FOIA
disclosures. First, however, we examine how two courts have ana-
lyzed the legislative history to answer this question.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT
The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) is intended to pro-
tect consumers in two ways. First, under the CPSA, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is authorized to develop, pro-
mulgate, and enforce mandatory safety standards for consumer
products.114 Second, it is authorized to operate an Injury Informa-
v. CPSC, 598 F.2d 790, 804 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 479 (1979)
(No. 79-521). Apparently CPSC fears that it will become a guarantor of the
fairness and accuracy of its disclosures, and that evaluating fairness and accuracy
will become a major administrative burden. The administrative burdens of FOIA
may be of legitimate concern to many agencies, see Koch & Rubin, A Proposal for
a Comprehensive Restructuring of the Public Information System, 1979 DuxE L.J.
1, 1-15, and compliance often entails more responsibility than would treating
government files as a library. That compliance with a withholding statute requires
an agency to select and analyze data does not prevent it from qualifying under
exemption 3. FOIA § (a) (4) (B) authorizes courts to "examine the contents of
such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part
thereof shall be withheld .... " 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(B) (1976). The last
sentence of FOIA § (b) provides that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a
record shall be provided ... after deletion of the portions which are exempt under
this subsection." Id. § 552(b). See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Alexander, 419 F. Supp.
235, 238-39 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Chamberlain v.
Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 82 (1979) (Internal
Revenue records); Irons v. Gottschalk, 548 F.2d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 965 (1977) (patent applications); Fonda v. CIA, 434 F. Supp. 498, 504
(D.D.C. 1977).
L14 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2058-2060 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
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tion Clearinghouse, and to receive and publicize reports of hazards
in specific types or brands of consumer products.11 In particular,
the CPSA requires manufacturers to report to the Commission any
substantial hazards in their own products of which they become
aware.11
6
Despite the fact that the Freedom of Information Act was six
years old in 1972,117 when the CPSA was enacted 118 there is no
indication in the legislative history that Congress considered the
issue of FOIA requests for data that the Commission was unpre-
pared to release on its own. In drafting the CPSA, Congress ap-
parently thought of the FOIA as telling agencies how to make
information available to the public, not as providing a vehicle for
compelling disclosures. 119 Consequently, CPSA section 6 120 refers
to information "protected" by the FOIA exemptions in paragraph
(a)(1) 121 and separately prescribes the "particular criteria" for with-
holding in paragraph (b)(1), 12 2 but never specifically refers to FOIA
requests.
Litigation on the issue of withholding under section 6 has
focused on its structure and purpose. Subsection 6(a)(1) 13 reaffirms
by reference the withholding authority of the FOIA exemptions
115 Id. §§ 2054-2055. Apparently CPSC has been so preoccupied reacting to
reports of hazards that it has been unable to devote much time to developing
standards. See Kahan, Reporting of Substantial Product Hazards under Section 15
of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 30 ADnN. L. REv. 289, 290-92 (1978).
116 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1976).
117FOIA was enacted in 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966), and
was substantially amended the following year, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54
(1967). The present form of FOIA is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II
1978).
118Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-
2082 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
119 See H.R. REP. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CoDE CoNe. & AD. Nmvs 4596, 4633 (contrasting the Commission's "publicly dis-
closed information" in one sentence with "information described in section 552(b)
[FOIA exemptions]," which is not required to be disclosed, in the next). See text
accompanying notes 219-21 infra.
12015 U.S.C. § 2055 (1976).
121 Id. § 2055(a) (1).
122 Id. § 2055(b) (1).
123 Subsection 6(a) (1) provides: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall be
deemed to require the release of any information described by subsection (b) of
section 552 of title 5 or which is otherwise protected by law from disclosure to the
public." 15 U.S.C. §2055(a)(1) (1976). Given that the CPSA does require the
Commission to publish, or make "affirmative disclosure," of safety information, see
text accompanying note 115 supra, the use here of the phrase "[niothing . . .
shall be deemed to require" suggests that § 6(a)(1) was intended to refer to such
"affirmative disclosures." The CPSC, on the other hand, has argued from the
reference to "section 552 of title 5" (the FOIA) that this section refers only to
FOIA requests, and has presumed a distinction between 6(a) (FOIA requests) and
6(b) ("affirmative disclosures").
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and of any other antidisclosure statutes, while 6(a)(2) 124 flatly re-
quires the withholding of material described in the Trade Secrets
Act. Subsection 6(b)(1),25 the exemption 3(B) withholding statute
at issue, requires thirty days' prior notice to manufacturers who are
identified in proposed releases, and then specifies the following re-
quirements for disclosures:
The Commission shall take reasonable steps to assure, prior
to its public disclosure thereof, that information from
which the identity of such manufacturer or private labeler
may be readily ascertained is accurate, and that such dis-
124 Subsection 6(a) (2) provides:
All information reported to or otherwise obtained by the Commission
or its representative under this chapter which information contains or
relates to a trade secret or other matter referred to in section 1905 of
title 18 shall be considered confidential and shall not be disclosed, except
that such information may be disclosed to other officers or employees
concerned with carrying out this chapter or when relevant in any pro-
ceeding under this chapter. Nothing in this chapter shall authorize the
withholding of information by the Commission or any officer or employee
under its control from the duly authorized committees of the Congress.
15 U.S.C. §2055(a)(2) (1976).
125 The full text of subsection 6(b) is as follows:
(1) Except as provided by paragraph (2) of this subsection, not less
than 30 days prior to its public disclosure of any information obtained
under this chapter, or to be disclosed to the public in connection therewith
(unless the Commission finds out that the public health and safety requires
a lesser period of notice), the Commission shall, to the extent practicable,
notify, and provide a summary of the information to, each manufacturer
or private labeler of any consumer product to which such information
pertains, if the manner in which such consumer product is to be desig-
nated or described in such information will permit the public to ascertain
readily the identity of such manufacturer or private labeler, and shall
provide such manufacturer or private labeler with a reasonable opportunity
to submit comments to the Commission in regard to such information.
The Commission shall take reasonable steps to assure, prior to its public
disclosure thereof, that information from which the identity of such
manufacturer or private labeler may be readily ascertained is accurate, and
that such disclosure is fair in the circumstances and reasonably related to
effectuating the purposes of this chapter. If the Commission finds that,
in the administration of this chapter, it has made public disclosure of
inaccurate or misleading information which reflects adversely upon the
safety of any consumer product, or the practices of any manufacturer,
private labeler, distributor, or retailer of consumer products, it shall, in a
manner similar to that in which such disclosure was made, publish a
retraction of such inaccurate or misleading information.
(2) Paragraph (1) (except for the last sentence thereof) shall not
apply to the public disclosure of (A) information about any consumer
product with respect to which product the Commission has filed an action
under section 2061 of this title (relating to imminently hazardous
products), or which the Commission has reasonable cause to believe is in
violation of section 2068 of this title (relating to prohibited acts), or
(B) information in the course of or concerning any administrative or
judicial proceeding under this chapter.
15 U.S.C. §2055(b)(1) (1976).
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closure is fair in the circumstances and reasonably related
to effectuating the purposes of this chapter.
26
In two cases, the Commission agreed to give FOIA requesters
data on specific brands of products even though it conceded that
the information might not be "accurate" or "fair", as required by
section 6(b)(1). 1'2 7 In both instances, the manufacturers filed re-
verse-FOIA suits to prevent disclosure, claiming that section 6(b)(1)
is an exemption 3 withholding statute that sets forth particular
criteria that the information in question did not meet. The Com-
mission defended with the argument that section 6(a) applies to
FOIA requests, but that section 6(b) applies only to its own
"affirmative disclosure," or publication, of product safety informa-
tion. The Second Circuit, in Pierce & Stevens Chemical Corp. v.
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 28 accepted the Commission's
argument in an opinion relying heavily upon policy considerations.
The Third Circuit, in a television industry suit, GTE Sylvania, Inc.
v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,2 9 found the Commission's
interpretation unsupported by the legislative history and rejected it.
A. The Second Circuit Approves Release
The FOIA requester in Pierce & Stevens was a tort plaintiff
who claimed she had been injured in a fire started by the company's
cleaning-fluid product. 30 She sought reports on the manufacturer
that had been prepared by the Food and Drug Administration prior
to the creation of the CPSC, and had later been transferred to the
CPSC.' 31 The Commission conceded "that portions of the reports
may be inaccurate," 132 and the district court enjoined disclosure. 33
Upon the Commission's appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.134 The
court of appeals' brief opinion relied primarily upon the observa-
tion that the public dissemination of information was a major
function of the CPSC, and, therefore, assumed section 6(b)(1) ap-
plies only to disclosures initiated by the CPSC. 35 Although the
1261d.
1271 Id.
128585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir, 1978).
129598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 479 (1979) (No. 79-521).
130 585 F.2d at 1383.
131 Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 439 F. Supp. 247, 249 (W.D.N.Y.
1977), rev'd, 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978).
132 Id. 250 n.3.
133 Id. 252.
'3 585 F.2d at 1389.
135 Id. 1386-89.
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court admitted that the Act requires accuracy and fairness at least
for the Commission's "affirmative disclosures," the court maintained
that "[s]uch considerations are relevant to disclosures initiated by
the Commission but not to disclosures of material requested under
the FOIA." 136 The court distinguished the two situations on the
grounds that official pronouncements carry a "government imprima-
tur" which may unfairly focus "adverse publicity on a particular
business enterprise." 137 Information released pursuant to an FOIA
request by a consumer group or a sympathetic tort claimant, how-
ever, may result in at least as much publicity being focused on a
business. Moreover, an agency press release can as easily correct or
retract inaccurate or unfair disclosures made in FOIA releases as
it can those made in government-initiated publications. More sig-
nificantly, the legislative history totally fails to support the Second
Circuit's analysis. A general congressional concern with the impact
of erroneous information is reflected in the adoption of section 6,
but there is no basis for concluding that Congress was concerned
with the supposed power of a "government imprimatur." 138
The Pierce & Stevens court mentioned two further points in
favor of its position. First, the court said that the Commission's
own interpretation of the statute was entitled to consideration.1 39
As the district court in GTE Sylvania observed, however, the Com-
mission published its interpretation of section 6 after becoming
involved in FOIA litigation, and a safety commission has no par-
ticular expertise to interpret a general question of administrative
law.'4 0 Second, the Pierce & Stevens court cited a passage in the
Conference Committee report on a 1976 amendment to the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act which stated that section 6(b) "relates to
public disclosure initiated by the Federal agency," specifically in
contrast to FOIA, which relates to information requested by the
public.14' This statement is inherently unreliable as a guide to




138 See note 223 infra.
339 585 F.2d at 1387.
140 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. CPSC, 443 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (D. Del. 1977).
141 585 F.2d at 1387 & n.23 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1022, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 27, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE ConG. & AD. NEWs 1017, 1029).
142 See United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963);
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[T]he views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."). But see
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81, 382-83 (1969). As with
many common law issues, there are rules both for and against the use of subsequent
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Second Circuit partially admitted.143 Moreover, it is an interpreta-
tion initially asserted by the CPSC itself in 1975 when it became
involved in litigating the issue.144
B. The Third Circuit Disagrees
The television-industry accident data at issue in GTE Sylvania
was systematically compiled by the CPSC itself. In March of 1974
the CPSC commenced a study of television-related accidents by re-
questing television manufacturers and the public to provide it with
any reports of accidents. 14 5 The only response from the industry
was a six-page Electronics Industry Association statistical summary.
Dissatisfied, the Commission in May issued a "special request" 146
for industry reports by its authority under section 27(b)(1). 147 The
CPSC had already received FOIA requests from Consumers Union
and Public Citizens' Health Research Group,' 48 but advised the
manufacturers that their "information [would] be received in con-
fidence." 149 It also advised them to substantiate their legal argu-
ments for confidentiality, which most submitters did.' 50  Still dis-
satisfied with the response, the Commission subpoenaed every type
of document that could be classified as a TV-accident report under
section 27(b)(3), 151 without promising confidentiality.
52
The district court opinion granting a preliminary injunction
against disclosure went to considerable lengths to show that the in-
formation, tabulated by computer, was inaccurate and that its re-
lease would have been unfair. The Electronics Industry Association
form, apparently used for most accident reports, carried a disclaimer
legislation and legislative history when construing a statute. Whatever value
legislative history has, common sense dictates that its value is greatly reduced %vhen
it purports to explain action taken by Congress years before.
143 585 F.2d at 1387 n.23.
'44GTE Sylvania Inc. v. CPSC, 404 F. Supp. 352, 369-70 (D. Del. 1975)
(preliminary injunction), made permanent, 443 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977),
aff'd, 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 479 (1979) (No. 79-521).
145 Id. 358.
146 Id.
147 15 U.S.C. § 2076(b) (1) (1976).
148 Consumers Union v. CPSC, 400 F. Supp. 848, 849-50 (D.D.C. 1975)
(denying disclosure of TV-accident data to FOIA requesters), ree'd, 590 F.2d
1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd sub noa. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union,
100 S. Ct. 1194 (1980). The district court in the Delaware reverse-FOIA suit
noted only that the Commission "decided to release" the bulk of its file. 404
F. Supp. at 357.
149 404 F. Supp. at 359.
150 Id.
15115 U.S.C. §2076(b)(3) (1976).
152 404 F. Supp. at 359-60.
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stating that "[t]he purported information in this form is based upon
such reports as are available, but in many cases will be incomplete,
unverified or even incorrect." 153 Only about one percent of the
accident reports were independently verified by the CPSC.1'5 The
deposition of the Commission's project director disclosed that the
category "TV-related accident" had been interpreted so broadly that
it included a fire caused by smoking while watching TV.' 5 Further,
reporting standards varied widely between manufacturers, and some
did not comply fully with the subpoena. Yet the Commission was
satisfied that it had a "sufficient" (if not a statistically valid) data base,
and did not prosecute subpoena violators. 15 6 Not surprisingly, the
district judge concluded that the data was inaccurate and its release
would be unfair. 57 He also found that disclosure would not be
"reasonably related to effectuating the purposes" of the CPSA, not-
ing that "the public would be misled" were this inaccurate infor-
mation released. 58 The district court subsequently granted a per-
manent injunction. 59
In affirming, the Third Circuit summarized the findings of the
district court, noting that the Commission did not dispute the ac-
curacy of the district court's factual determinations.16 0 The bulk
of its opinion focused on the legislative history of section 6, in an
attempt to disprove the CPSC's assertion of a dichotomy between
parts (a) and (b). The court dismissed the meagre legislative his-
tory evidence presented by the Second Circuit to buttress its policy
analysis in Pierce & Stevens, and refuted additional arguments ad-
vanced by the Commission.' 6' Despite its conclusion, the Third
Circuit failed to offer any convincing explanation of the peculiarities
of structure and terminology in section 6.
153 Id. 360.




'58 Id. 365, 372-73.
159443 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977).
160 598 F.2d at 799.
161 Id. 803-05. See text accompanying notes 207-08 & 213-17 infra. The best
explanation of the difference in outcomes may be the difference in factual settings.
In Pierce & Stevens, the FOIA requester was the victim of a fire that "destroyed her
house and injured her." The fire was allegedly caused by the product about which
she sought information. 585 F.2d at 1383. In GTE Sylvania, the requesters were
consumer groups seeking admittedly inaccurate information in the form of a
computer compilation made by the CPSC itself from unverified raw data. 404
F. Supp. at 352-59.
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C. The Unresolved Issue
In concluding that the criteria laid out in section 6(b)(l) were
applicable to FOIA requests, the Third Circuit followed the district
court in holding that the criteria were sufficiently particular to sat-
isfy the requirement of the amended exemption 3.162 The district
court in Pierce & Stevens came to the same conclusion.' 63 In that
case, the Second Circuit subsequently observed that it did not have
to reach the question.'64 In addition to these judicial evaluations,
one law review note has concluded that section 6(b)(1) satisfies the
amended exemption 3.'15 This conclusion appears to be the logical
resolution of the threshold issue. At first glance "accurate" and
"fair" may not appear any more specific than the standards, "would
adversely affect" and "not required in the interest of the public,"
that were at issue in the legislatively overruled case of Adminis-
trator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson.66 The issue,
though, is finer than the relative precision of adjectives. To deter-
mine whether a statute qualifies as an exemption 3(B) withholding
statute a court must consider the intent of Congress in drafting it.167
The determinative question is whether the agency is sufficiently well
directed in applying the withholding criteria.168 Further, the al-
leged intent of Congress to authorize withholding must be measured
against the clear intent of Congress, in enacting the FOIA, to make
certain types of information routinely available. 69 Under the strict
requirements of the amended exemption 3, Congress must have
already balanced the need for withholding against the policy of
disclosure. The CPSC has conceded that Congress intended to im-
pose some limits on its own disclosures. The remaining issue is
whether that intent also extends to FOIA requests. The courts,
however, have not addressed this issue and the underlying policy
conflict realistically.
The Second Circuit relied primarily on a policy analysis, and
saw no conflict between the disclosure policy of the FOIA and that
of the CPSA.170 Yet Congress did require fairness and accuracy in
102 598 F.2d at 814.
163 439 F. Supp. at 251.
364 585 F.2d at 1389.
165 See COLUM. Note, supra note 87, at 1045 n.100.
16422 U.S. 255 (1975). See text accompanying notes 81-87 supra.
167 See text accompanying notes 102 & 107 supra.
368 See text accompanying notes 108 & 109 supra.
169 See note 2 supra & text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
170 585 F.2d at 1387-88.
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the latter, and the court did not adequately explain the existence
of that limitation. It merely presumed the existence of a policy
distinction between FOIA requests and "affirmative disclosures,"
with scant justification for imputing that policy to Congress. 71
In GTE Sylvania the Third Circuit relied on ambiguous legis-
lative history without exploring the underlying policy reasons for
restricting inaccurate and unfair disclosures of every kind. It dis-
cussed textual compromises made in 1972 between Congress and
"the Administration." The court did not face the issue that lead-
ing supporters of consumer product safety suspected the Nixon
Administration of seeking to sabotage both consumer protection
and freedom of information.172 In short, it considered pieces of
legislative history in a vacuum, with no concern for the historical
and political context in which they occurred. This Comment will
now examine that history.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE POLICY
A. The Use of Legislative History
Resorting to legislative history to interpret a statute may be a
dangerous, distorting enterprise. 173 Despite its common use today,
legislative history remains a device which should only be used when
a statute is ambiguous. 74 One reason for imposing this limitation
is that the rules for interpreting legislative history are imprecise.
For example, some Supreme Court opinions declare that the remarks
of a single legislator, even a sponsor, are not controlling,' 75 while
others accord them substantial weight. 76 Similarly, the Court has
said that subsequent legislation implying an interpretation of an
earlier statute is entitled to great weight,177 while a committee report
of a later Congress should not be considered at all.
7 8
171 Id. 1387 & n.22.
172 See 598 F.2d at 805-06. See notes 188, 189 & 202 infra & accompanying
text.
173 See, for example, the emphatic remarks of Justice Jackson, concurring in
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1951) and
in United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-21 (1953).
1
7 4 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
175 E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979).
17
6 E.g., Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564
(1976).
377E.g., FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958).
178 E.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979); see also note
142 supra.
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Whether section 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act
applies to FOIA requests cannot be determined conclusively from
the language of the statute. Moreover, resort to legislative history
may be peculiarly necessary when, as here, the statute is "the product
of legislative compromise of strongly held views." 179 The opinions
of the courts of appeals construing the CPSA indicate that a dis-
torted impression may result when legislative history is read with
inadequate regard for the political context in which it was written.
The following discussion will demonstrate that the CPSA resulted
from compromise between the goals of consumer interests reflected
in one bill and the goals of commercial interests reflected in another.
The Third Circuit's opinion in GTE Sylvania, while empha-
sizing legislative history, failed to consider this political struggle and
the light it sheds on the available documents.1s° The court pre-
sumably felt that it was forbidden to look to the partisan politics
that shaped legislation for some guidance to the policies that the
legislation was intended to serve. Instead, the court sought a
specific answer to the question whether section 6(b)(1) applies to
FOIA requests. This question is misguided, because Congress never
directly considered the issue. The court's opinion would have been
more convincing had it looked for the general purpose of section
6(b)(1), and then applied that purpose to the FOIA situation that
Congress did not consider. The fact that the Third Circuit may
have reached the correct result is, therefore, somewhat fortuitous.
B. The History of the Consumer Product Safety Act
The Consumer Product Safety Act had its origins in the 1967
appointment of a National Commission on Product Safety.18' Its
report, 12 published in 1970, strongly recommended the creation of
a permanent, independent commission and offered the draft version
of a statute. In 1971 the House and Senate both began hearings
on the subject,8 3 and the Nixon Administration presented its own
179NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 179 (1967).
180 GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. CPSC, 598 F.2d 790, 805-12 (3d Cir.), cert. granted,
100 S. Ct. 479 (1979) (No. 79-521).
181 joint Resolution to establish a National Commission on Product Safety,
Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466 (1967).
282 NA-IoNAL CoavuIssIoN ozi PoDucT SAFETY, FnsAL REPORT (1970),
reproduced in Consumer Product Safety Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.
8110, 8157, 260, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 319-533 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings].
183 House Hearings, supra note 182; Consumer Product Safety Act of 1971:
Hearings before the Comm. on Commerce, S. 983, 1685, 1797, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
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legislative proposal, the creation of a product-safety function in the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within HEW.""' Under the
Administration bill the new agency would have been required to
use the procedural safeguards of the formal rulemaking process, a
time-consuming mechanism.185  The bill also provided elaborate
protection for trade secrets, and other limits on disclosure 186 not
contained in the National Commission's bill.
1 8 7
These and other differences caused consumer advocates to re-
gard the Administration bill as a Trojan horse in the consumer
movement. In particular, the attempt to put the new consumer
agency inside HEW was regarded as a device both to bury it beneath
a mountain of bureaucracy and to subject it to political control. 88
Arnold B. Elkind, who had been chairman of the National Com-
mission on Product Safety, testified that "the administration's bill
looks pretty good on paper . . . but creates a paper tiger" by deny-
ing independence to the consumer agency.189
Nearly all the consumer advocates who spoke against the Ad-
ministration bill limited their attacks to the issues of agency inde-
pendence and procedural standards.190 Only the testimony of
Elkind and of Ralph Nader emphasized that the Administration's
proposed limits on disclosure would stifle the publicity power of the
consumer agency.1 1 As a consequence, Congress compromised with
the Nixon Administration by adopting nearly all of its restrictions
on disclosure.
184 H.R. 8110, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1971), reprinted in Htouse Hearings,
supra note 182, at 3-4.
185 Id. §§ 5-10, House Hearings, supra note 182, at 9-20.
186 Id. § 4(c), House Hearings, supra note 182, at 7-9.
187See H.R. 8157, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3, 7-11 & 19 (1971), reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 182, at 37, 45-52, & 68-69.
188 One of the sharpest denunciations of this proposal came from Congress-
woman Sullivan, who noted that she had been familiar with FDA matters since
her election to Congress in 1953. She asserted:
[In HEW], decisions are often made at the top in the Department, not
on scientific and public safety considerations, so much as they are on
political bases . . . . In consequence, decisions of the agency which
should have been based entirely on scientific and legal determinations
intended to protect the consuming public have been imposed from above,
in too many instances, to reflect political judgments ....
118 CONG. REc. 31385-86 (1972).
189 House Hearings, supra note 182, at 302-03.
190 See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 182, at 928-30 (remarks of David A.
Swankin, director of Washington office of Consumers Union).
191Id. 307 (Elkind), 897 (Nader).
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Both chambers produced bills that included some elements of
compromise with the Administration. The chief original bills in
the House were the Administration bill (H.R. 8110),192 and a version
of the National Commission bill sponsored by Congressman John
Moss (H.R. 8157). 193 The final House compromise, H.R. 15003,194
which was the basis of the Act, followed the National Commission
proposal of creating an independent Consumer Product Safety
Commission. As indicated in the Commerce Committee report,
however, H.R. 15003 was a compromise with the Administration
in that it incorporated both APA procedures and the "substantial
evidence" standard of review.195 But neither the official report, nor
the floor remarks of the principle sponsors emphasizing compromise,
noted that it was also the Nixon Administration's proposal on dis-
closure that had been accepted. 196
Although the final enactment was designated S. 3419, it was
actually H.R. 15003, because the House voted to "amend" the
Senate bill by substituting the entire text with its own version.
97
As a glance at the text of the bills shows, and as the Conference
Committee report' 98 repeatedly indicates, the Senate went along
with virtually all of the House changes, winning only a few minor
192 See note 184 supra.
193 See note 187 supra.
394H.R. 15003, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in H.R. IEsP. No.
1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-20 (1972).
95 H.R. l'P. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1972). For a discussion
of APA standards of review, see note 53 supra.
196 H.R. REP. No. 1153, supra note 195, at 30-31; 118 CoNG. REc. 31375 &
31393 (Rep. Staggers), 31378 (Rep. H.R. REP. No. 1153, supra note 195, at Moss)
(1972).
In the Senate, the Administration bill was S. 1797, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 183, at 5; the National Commission bill,
introduced by Senators Magnuson and Frank Moss, was S. 983, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 183, at 62. The Commerce
Committee report described the final version (S. 3419) as a compromise in that it
accepted the Administration idea of adding consumer product safety to FDA, but
followed the National Commission in giving independence to the new agency.
S. BEP. No. 749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1972). The Administration's primary
objective, however, was not to create a larger agency, but to keep the new agency
subject to an executive department. The Senate bill followed the Administration
proposal on information disclosure only in affirming the applicability of all the
FOIA exemptions. See S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 109, 113 & 301 (1972),
reprinted in S. BEP. No. 749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-56 (1972). On the floor
of the Senate, § 113 became § 114; see 118 CONG. REc. 21905-08 (1972).
197 118 CONG. REc. 31417 (1972).
L9S H.R. REP. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4596.
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points of its own. 199 As a result, the House legislative history is
considerably more authoritative.
The legislative history of neither chamber supports the inter-
pretation of section 6 urged by the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission in its FOIA litigation. No statement in either house sub-
stantiates the alleged dichotomy between FOIA disclosures in section
6(a) and "affirmative disclosures" in section 6(b). Neither the
section-by-section analysis of H.R. 15003 contained in the House
Commerce Committee report nor the floor remarks of members
reporting the bill mention the supposed distinction. For example,
Congressman Moss, a principle sponsor of the bill, simply said that
the bill contained "careful provisions protecting against the un-
necessary disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential business
information." 200
On the other hand, there is ample evidence that Congress in-
tended greater protection for commercial information than that
envisioned by the National Commission. Congressman Moss, in
his opening remarks as chairman of the House committee hearings,
listed six principle differences between the proposals of the National
Commission and those of the Administration, including one related
to disclosure of information.20 1  The Administration bill, he
pointed out,
creat[ed] a new category of protected information, by pro-
hibiting disclosure of ". . trade secrets, formulas,
processes, costs, methods of doing business, or other com-
petitive information not otherwise available to the general
public." I am sure the subcommittee will want to ex-
199 Representative Broyhill for the House conferees reported only a few small
changes in the bill, 118 CONG. REc. 36045-46 (1972); Senator Moss discussed nine
specific provisions, nearly all of which were substantial concessions by the Senate.
Id. 36197-99.
200Id. 31378; see also id. 31381 (remarks of Rep. Broyhill, that the Com-
mission must give manufacturers prior notice of a decision "to release any in-
formation"). The Senate bill, with very different public disclosure sections from
the House version, also fails to suggest any distinction between "affirmative dis-
closures" and FOIA requests. Sections 109 (Injury Information Clearinghouse)
and 301 (Consumer Product Safety Commission) describe agency-initiated dis-
closures, but contain provisions on disclosure that are identical to those in § 114
(Public Access to Information). See note 196 supra. Moreover, a letter from the
General Counsel of the Department of Commerce made identical criticisms of § 109
and § 114, saying in both cases that the bill should require that any releases "be
fair and accurate." Letter of William N. Letson (Jan. 24, 1972), reprinted in
S. REP. No. 749, supra note 196, at 100 & 102.
201 House Hearings, supra note 182, at 299-300. See notes 184-87 supra and
accompanying text.
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amine carefully this proposed change in the Freedom of
Information Act.
202
The final version of the bill, however, prohibited the disclosure of
matters covered by the Trade Secrets Act in section 6(a)(2). 203 Per-
haps Congressman Moss won the specific point of deleting this
Nixon Administration language, but he had to concede the under-
lying policy of creating an exception to the FOIA. His attitude
on disclosure was again revealed in an exchange with Ralph Nader
a month later, when Moss expressed the hope that Congress would
liberalize the FOIA itself (as it did in 1974),20' but added that for
the present, he "would not want the information under this act to
be tied to the Freedom of Information Act guidelines." 205 That
Moss's colleagues on his committee, however, chose to protect com-
mercial information along the lines proposed by the Administration
is shown by the fact that section 6(a)(1) incorporated all the FOIA
exemptions, and that section 6(a)(2) made the withholding of trade
secrets mandatory.
206
In its argument before the Third Circuit, the CPSC relied on
a passage from 1976 oversight hearings on regulatory reform.
There, Congressman Moss agreed with the chairman of the Com-
mission that section 6(b) applied to "affirmative disclosures," but
not to FOIA requests, and styled himself "the primary author of
both acts." 207 But as the discussion above indicates, Moss was not
the author of the disclosure section of the CPSA as enacted, and
originally had recommended changing it. In 1972, Moss had em-
phasized the element of compromise in H.R. 15003 when he spon-
sored it on the floor of the House, noting that "[i]t represents a
part of the thinking of each member of the subcommittee. There
is not a member who cannot point to something in this legislation
202 House Hearings, supra note 182, at 300 (quoting H.R. 8110, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. §4(c)(1) (1971)). Moss's characterization of this as a change in the FOIA
apparently meant that he considered it an absolute bar to disclosure, under
exemption 3.
203IH.R. 15003, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §6(a)(2) (1972), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-20 (1972). The Trade Secrets Act, supra
note 44, is in fact broader in its scope of protected information than the Adminis-
tration proposal quoted in the text at note 202 supra.
204 Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.
205 House Hearings, supra note 182, at 910.
206 H.R. 15003, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(a) (1)-(2) (1972), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).
207 GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. CPSC, 598 F.2d 790, 811 (3d Cir.), cert. granted,
100 S. Ct. 479 (1979) (No. 79-521) (quoting Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. IV, 7-8 (1976)).
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and say, 'That is my amendment. It is there because that is what I
proposed.' "208 His 1976 remarks are merely those of a single
member made four years after the event and, furthermore, he was
not the author of the passage in question.
If it was the Administration's section on information disclosure
that was adopted, it is unrealistic to suppose that the legislature
acted with an intent more specific than a general desire to protect
commercial information from excessive prying. Nor did the Ad-
ministration itself ever suggest a distinction between "affirmative"
and FOIA disclosures, or mention the "imprimatur" of official dis-
closures. The Administration bill was apparently drafted in
HEW,20 9 and Secretary Richardson provided a section-by-section
analysis of it.210 This analysis refers obliquely to "the public in-
formation section of what was formerly the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (now 5 U.S.C. 552)," 211 but fails to suggest different
purposes in the two paragraphs of the information disclosure
section.
21 -2
A passage in the House committee report describing section 6
refers to information which the Commission "determines to dis-
seminate," 213 and thereby appears to give support to the "affirmative
disclosure" analysis. But, as the Third Circuit noted in GTE
Sylvania, there is nothing in the passage which could not refer to
compliance with an FOIA request.214 Moreover, the report does
not indicate that section 6(b) refers only to "affirmative disclosures,"
a distinction which presumably would have been expressed had it
been the specific intent of the committee.
The Third Circuit opinion quoted five paragraphs of the re-
port on section 6, ending with the sentence:
Where it is discovered that the disclosure of information
has been inaccurate or misleading and reflects adversely
on the safety of a consumer product or the practices of
208118 CONG. REc. 31379 (1972).
209See House Hearings, supra note 182, at 1050 (remarks of Secretary
Richardson in introducing his General Counsel for Legislation).
210 See House Hearings, supra note 182, at 188-92.
211 Id. 188. Apparently, the use of the term "Freedom of Information" was
intentionally avoided.
212 In his House testimony, Richardson contrasted the trade secrets provisions
of the National Commission bill with those of the Administration bill, but neither
Richardson, nor Donald Hirsch, HEW General Counsel for Legislation, referred to
special treatment of "affirmative disclosure" in the latter. House Hearings, supra
note 182, at 188-92. Congressman Moss did not question either man on information
disclosure.
213 H.R. REP. No. 1153, supra note 195, at 32.
214 598 F.2d at 808-09.
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any manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of the product,
the Commission is directed to publish a retraction in a
manner similar to that in which the original disclosure
was made .... 215
The court omitted the end of the paragraph, which continues:
It is intended that a retraction receive at least the same
notoriety as the original disclosure. Accordingly, if the
Commission had publicly released information to the news
media which was inaccurate or misleading, the retraction
must also be released to the news media and not simply
placed in the Federal Register .... 216
Not only affirmative publications, but FOIA disclosures as well,
may "receive" notoriety, and may have to be retracted in the inter-
est of fairness by notices to the news media that carried the original
report. The use of the specific example in the committee report
follows from use of the word "publish," but the statute says that
the Commission must publish a retraction when it discloses in-
accurate information, not just when it affirmatively publishes it.217
Moreover, committee reports are not especially reliable when
they merely imply a shade of meaning or mention a minor clarifica-
tion.2 1 8 An express statement that the committee intended section
6(b) to apply only to "affirmative disclosures" would be authorita-
tive, but the language quoted above is not. The Conference Com-
mittee Report on the CPSA concludes simply, "[t]he Commission is
to publish a retraction of any inaccurate or misleading information
disclosed to the public." 219 The Report begins its discussion of the
House bill's disclosure provision by describing section 6(a),220 and
215 Id.
210 H.R. RP. No. 1153, supra note 195, at 32.
2 17 See note 125 supra.
2 18 In part this unreliability may stem from the fact that committee reports are
often prepared by the staff, and are not reviewed by all members of the committee.
For example, Senator Cotton, a member of the Senate Commerce Committee,
criticized a passage in the Committee's report on S. 3419, saying that it "was,
naturally, prepared by the staff. It is getting now so that the tail is wagging the
dog. The staff is running the committee most of the time. I did not know it was
in there. I think it is utterly absurd and utterly ridiculous." 118 CONC. REC.
21898 (1972).
219 H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 198, at 41, reprinted in [1972] U.S. ConE
CONG. & An. NEWS 4596, 4633 (emphasis added).
220 Id. 40, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4632 ("In-
formation obtained by the Commission which contained or related to a trade
secret . . . could not be publicly disclosed.").
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two sentences later it describes section 6(b),221 without a hint of
transition in between.
Standing alone, this omission says little about congressional in-
tent with respect to FOIA requests to the CPSC. Within the con-
text of the entire legislative history, it is one of many points at
which Congress failed to make the alleged distinction between
FOIA requests and "affirmative disclosures."
A cumulative interpretation of the Administration's proposal,
and therefore of section 6 as enacted, seems far more logical than
the CPSC analysis. Donald Hirsch, General Counsel for Legislation
of HEW, noted that "it was thought important to give assurance
to the industry of the good faith of the Department, and that may
have resulted in somewhat more protection to information the
industry considers confidential than is absolutely necessary." 222
The substance of all that protection was enacted, and certainly no
one in the Nixon Administration suggested that information re-
quested under the FOIA should receive any less protection than
information disclosed in other ways.
C. The Policy of Restricting Disclosures
Had Congress intended to differentiate between FOIA requests
and "affirmative disclosures," it presumably would have done so for
some policy reason.223  Yet the record does not evince a policy basis
for distinguishing between the two. Rather, the legislative history
suggests that Congress adopted a policy of fair and accurate dis-
closure that it did not intend to limit.
221 Id. ("Not less than 30 days before the public disclosure of information
obtained under the provisions of the House amendment. ).
222 House Hearings, supra note 182, at 1051.
223 The only policy reason ever mentioned before Congress that supported a
higher standard of fairness and accuracy in the case of an "affirmative disclosure"
was to temper the alleged power of a "government imprimatur." The testimony
of a vice president of General Electric, warning of the effect of "the apparent
imprimatur of the U.S. Government," was apparently the only such statement the
CPSC could find in the legislative history for its Third Circuit appeal. Testimony
of James F. Young, quoted in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. CPSC, 598 F.2d 790, 807
(3d Cir.) cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 479 (1979) (No. 79-521). There is little
evidence that this policy was seriously considered by the legislature. The opinions
of consumer advocates, for example, while strongly emphasizing the importance of
publicity, fail to ascribe any particular impact to governmental publicity. See, e.g.,
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 98 (1970), reproduced
in House Hearings, supra note 182, at 431; testimony of Arnold Elkind, House
Hearings, supra note 182, at 307. A strained interpretation of a statute should rest
on more than an alleged policy objective of which Congress was scarcely, if at
all, aware.
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The hearings, documents, reports, and debates suggest that
neither house considered what was to happen if the Commission
received an FOIA request for admittedly unfair or inaccurate
records. There is no evidence of a policy decision to provide greater
safeguards over official pronouncements than over disclosures in
general. If anything, the Nixon Administration origins of section 6
indicate, as Donald Hirsch said, that industry was being given as
much protection as possible,224 suggesting that FOIA exemptions,
trade secrets protection, and guarantees of accuracy and fairness
were intended to occur cumulatively in the Act, not alternatively.
As Secretary Richardson put it, the lesser protections of the National
Commission bill "might well dampen the willingness of responsible
manufacturers to cooperate with the Government." 225 Read as a
whole, the legislative history suggests only a general legislative policy
that business should be protected from inaccurate or unfair dis-
closures.
One could argue, of course, that the policies discussed in the
legislative history are irrelevant to the FOIA context, on the as-
sumption that Congress did not discuss the FOIA but, nevertheless,
had an unexpressed intention of limiting its concern to "affirmative
disclosures." One could further assume that the alleged impact of a
"government imprimatur" was not the only reason for requiring
special care in making official statements. When the government
drafts the statements, it thereby becomes responsible for using erro-
neous information and creating unfair comparisons. An FOIA
release of documents submitted by outsiders, on the other hand,
may be viewed as merely passing on errors committed by others.
This difference was obscured in the GTE Sylvania litigation
because the major object of the FOIA request was a computer sum-
mary prepared by the Commission. By producing this document,
the government became partially responsible for factual inaccuracies
that could have been eliminated by requiring verification of each
accident report. The government was entirely responsible for in-
accuracies and unfairness caused by the agency's failure to enforce
its own subpoenas. Even under an "affirmative disclosure" reading
of section 6(b)(1), those manufacturers who fully complied with the
subpoenas would be protected from a government-initiated release
of a document containing inaccurate or incomplete data. The
Commission's use of the data portrays those who supplied the most
224 See text accompanying note 222 supra.
2W House Hearings, supra note 182, at 969.
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complete reports as having worse accident records than those who
submitted incomplete reports or none at all.
It is unsatisfactory to regard the government as an impartial
custodian of manufacturer-supplied raw data, not responsible for the
harm caused by a passive FOIA release. This view suggests that a
government agency may gather information by subpoena in a man-
ner so haphazard that it is not permitted to publish the results
itself, but may yet pass on the data to the public. The harm of
using the powers of government to extract information, without
enforcing uniform reporting criteria, is the same whether the
government publishes the information on its own initiative or
merely releases raw data. Of course, this argument could be abused
by manufacturers if they believed they could prevent the Commis-
sion from disclosing information simply by defying its subpoenas
or by failing to follow uniform record-keeping standards. But the
CPSC has authority to prescribe standards for making the reports it
requires.2 26 By obtaining a grab-bag of existing documents, rather
than defining exactly what it wants reported and setting require-
ments for verification, the CPSC invites the submission of data
which could never provide a fair and accurate comparison of manu-
facturers. The Commission has authority to issue subpoenas and
to enforce its powers under the CPSA; 227 by failing to obtain uni-
form compliance, it invalidates the statistical basis of any findings
it might make.
The argument that the government is only responsible for
documents that it has prepared, therefore, overlooks the fact that
the government has unique power to obtain information not other-
wise available to the public. Such power should be used only for a
legitimate governmental function. If a policy reason for section
6(b)(1) is to be found outside the legislative history, it is that the
government has a responsibility to use this power fairly. Rather
than imagine that Congress intended to limit section 6(b)(1) to
"affirmative disclosures," we should presume that Congress would
have wanted the CPSC to ensure that its information gathering was
fair, accurate, and reasonably related to the purposes of the CPSA.
The Commission has the power to ensure that in all future cases
the data it collects will be reasonably fair and accurate.
226 15 U.S.C. § 2076(b)(1) (1976).
2271d. §§2076(b)(3) & (7). Subsection 2076(b)(7)(A) gives the Com-
mission power to go into court on its own if the attorney general fails to provide
representation within 45 days after a request.
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CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT
CONCLUSION
This Comment has endeavored to ascertain congressional pur-
pose by examining the legislative history of the Consumer Product
Safety Act in its entirety. It may be objected that the analysis has
relied on statements by spokesmen for private industry and for the
executive branch, raising the views of those outsiders to the level
of congressional intent. Such views have been relied on only to
the extent that they were actually presented to Congress, and only
for the purpose of showing that Congress was aware of the policy
objectives of those who drafted and supported pending legislation.
When, as in this instance, Congress adopts a section of a bill drafted
by the Administration with virtually no changes, it is a reasonable
presumption that Congress also accepts the understanding of that
section propounded by the Administration.228 When the statements
of the draftsmen, the comments in the committee reports, and the
plain language of the statute all suggest the same interpretation,
there is no reason to suppose that the legislature intended to differ
with the executive.
It may also be objected that the Congress of 1972 could not
really have "intended" to adopt the policy of the Nixon Administra-
tion on information disclosure, and that the Administration's
language was accepted only for political convenience. There are
two difficulties in assuming that Congress intended this language
to mean something other than what the Administration originally
intended. First, there is no direct evidence to support this analysis
or to suggest that Congress understood some other meaning. Second,
and much more significantly, this approach is based on the idea
that litigation can be used to refight political battles which were
decided years ago. Consumer advocates obtained an independent
consumer product safety agency in 1972, but they failed to prevent
rather strict limitations on that agency's authority to make public
disclosures. Either their supporters in Congress considered some
compromise with the views of businessmen and of the Nixon Ad-
ministration to be politically necessary, or enough of them actually
preferred that part of the Administration proposal. In our demo-
cratic system the legislation ultimately enacted reflects the wishes
of various groups. Political compromise may not be logically pure,
but it keeps a political system functioning in which complex pro-
posals can rarely be expected to please everyone. Legislative in-
228 Even the Third Circuit opinion in GTE Sylvania, while scarcely relying
upon such sources, says that "the most authoritative reading of the intended scope
of section [6]" is that of its HEW draftsmen. 598 F.2d at 807.
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consistencies in political philosophy are to be expected; they reflect
what was democratically feasible at the time of the enactment.
The text of section 6(b)(1) does not expressly support the inter-
pretation suggested by the Commission. The terms of the statute
require that the Commission's "public disclosure of any informa-
tion" be "accurate, . . . fair in the circumstances and reasonably
related to effectuating the purposes of" the Act.229 The CPSC's
interpretation seeks to restrict the applicability of a general prin-
ciple, but it has not proved its case in the text of the statute, in the
legislative history, or in the policy of the Act. In its eight years of
existence, the Commission has not demonstrated that its powers of
adverse publicity are any greater than those of Ralph Nader or
Consumers Union so as to require greater restraints. Congress gave
no special consideration to adverse governmental publicity in 1972,
and there is no reason to limit its restriction on unfair and in-
accurate disclosures now.
229 15 U.S.C. §2055(b)(1) (1976).
[NoTE: After this Comment had gone to press, the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 48
U.S.L.W. 4658 (U.S. June 9, 1980), affirming the Third Circuit opinion discussed
herein. The Supreme Court did not materially differ with the Court of Appeals.]
